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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the political economy. of capitalization in a
Tiebout model when there is a rent-seeking public bureaucracy. A new
approach is suggested for testing for the influence of successful local
public sector rent-seeking on local property values. We present empirical
evidence showing that property values are lower in cities which pay their
public sector workers significantly more than similar public sector workers
earn in other cities. Finally, we discuss how the regulatory process can be
used to distribute rents arising from a short-run Tiebout disequilibrium to
landowners, public sector workers, and renters.
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Whether local public goods and services are efficiently provided has been
the subject of much debate since Tiebout's (1956) response to Samuelson
(19514). Urban economists have focused on capitalization of tax and spending
differentials into land prices as the primary indicators of whether Tiebout's
professed market forces are in fact operational. However, the capitalization
works typically ignore any possible ramifications of public bureaucracy rent-
seeking. The justification for this usually was that the communities studied
tended to be residential suburbs with little absentee landownership. The
majority homeowners' voting power implicitly or explicitly was assumed to
prevent the bureaucracy from capturing any rents. Another line of research,
however, has focused precisely on the public choice and political strategy
aspects of the issue, emphasizing that bureaucratic behavior can lead to a
non—optimal provision of local public services.1 Epple and Zelenitz (1981)
and Rose-Ackerman (1983) among others have begun to argue for the need to form
some synthesis of the two approaches because both the economics and politics
of the issue appear relevant.
This paper investigates the political economy of capitalization in a
Tiebout model. A rew approach to test for the presence of and effects of
successful bureaucratic rent-seeking within the standard Oates—type
capitalization regression framework is suggested and some preliminary results
are presented. The implications successful rent-seeking has on the
interpretation of tax and spending capitalization coefficients are also
analyzed. It is cear that the standard interpretations of capitalization
into land values ir terms of the Tiebout hypothesis are not valid. We also
more carefully deveThp some of the political and economic implications of
bureaucratic rent-seeking in a short-run Tiebout disequilibrium. Variousparties including landowners, bureaucrats, and renters can use the regulatory
process to capture a share of the short-run rents in a Tiebout
disequilibrium. Expanding upon the public choice research's focus on
reversion rules, we contend that different and broader forms of regulation
ranging from land use controls to rent controls need to be analyzed at least
partially as economic rent-enhancing and rent-splitting devices.
Section 2: Tiebout and Public Choice Perspectives on Local Public Sector
Efficiency and Capitalization
-
Initially,the existence of capitalization into land values was thought
to substantiate Tiebout's claims of efficiency (Oates (1969)). Edel and Sciar
(19714) clarified this issue by noting that supply conditions were crucial for
capitalization to occur. Capitalization into land values could occur only in
a short-run disequilibrium context when there was a shortage of a given type
of' community. Their work inspired a flurry of empirical investigations on
this topic (Meadows (1976), Rosen and Fullerton (1977), etc.). The key
implications were: (1) land value capitalization implies a suboptimal
provision of local government services exists; (2) no such capitalization
implies that efficiency is achieved; and, (3) declining levels of
capitalization through time imply that an efficient Tiebout equilibrium is
being approached.
Epple, Zelenitz, and Visscher (1978) and Epple and Zelenitz (1981)
provided further theoretical clarification and critiques of tests of' the
Tiebout hypothesis. Their works highlight that if residents are mobile but
jurisdictional boundaries are fixed, an Oates-type housing price regression is
really a test of the equal utility hypothesis, not of the Tiebout
hypothesis. State: differently, the test is whether housing prices
(representing nontraded goods) adjust to compensate for differing fiscal
-2-climates in order to keep utility constant across jurisdictions. Edel and
Sclar (19714) were correct about no land price capitalization if a full Tiebout
equilibrium included variable jurisdictional boundaries. Otherwise, it was
possible for the local government sector to extract rents from landowners.
In the public choice literature, the issue of efficient provision of
local services usually was debated in the context of control by the local
bureaucracy versus the median voter. Niskanen (1975) and Rorner and Rosenthal
(1978, 1979) argued that various factors (reversion rules for example) could
allow bureaucrats to control agendas and not provide the tax-service package
desired by the median voter. In a related context, Courant, Grarnlich, and
Rubinfeld (1979) analyzed how a local public service union with some monopoly
power might also be able to successfully capture economic rents. They
concluded that highly mobile residents substantially limited the scope for
successful rent-seeking behavior.
While the public choice researchers have cogently argued that
bureaucratic behavior can lead to a suboptimal provision of local public goods
and services, neither they nor other urban economists have adequately analyzed
the implications that body of work has for capitalization into land values or
possibly public sector wages. The next section considers the effects of
introducing a rent-seeking bureaucracy in a Tiebout model.
Section 3:EconomicRents, Capitalization, and Bureaucratic Behavior in a
Tiebout Model
In the standard Tiebout model in full equilibrium there is no role for a
rent—seeking public sector. However, a long-term Tiebout equilibrium probably
is not the normal state of affairs in a dynamic urban setting. If excess
demand appears for a given type of community in a metropolitan area, the
supply response is likely to be very slow. The geographical compactness of
-3—most urban areas makes expansion or entry of communities difficult if not
impossible. Henderson (1985) in particular has made the question of whether
jurisdictional boundaries are mobile a matter of current debate. If they are
not mobile in the short run then economic rents may be available. Further, if
excess demand tends to persist in this market, the amount of economic rents
available could be quite large. This increases the likelihood that various
interest groups will attempt to capture the rents and reinforces the need to
control for the possible effects of local bureaucracy rent—seeking on
-
capitalizationinto land prices. The familiar Tiebout model outlined below
highlights the relationship between capitalization and rent-seeking.
A number of assumptions underlie Tiebout's famous result. They are (a)
mobility for individuals, (b) knowledge on the part of consumers of all
relevant opportunities (everyone knows the entry price or each type of
community), Cc) existence of sufficient numbers of communities to insure
competition among them and to insure the availability of communities for each
individual's tastes, (d) no differences across communities from location
restrictions due to accessibility to employment centers, (e) no externalities
among communities from public services, and (f) the optimal city size exists
for each individual taste pattern and communities try to achieve the optimal
size so as to rniniize costs.
Each city is assumed to produce some public service S where
(1) Sf(N, L)
with Nland and Elabor.
For city A,
(2) SAf(NA, LA)
_14_Cities differ by the quality-adjusted amount of the service they provide. To
obtain 5A' an individual must occupy a site in jurisdiction A. All sites are
identical. For simplicity let construction costs be zero. Figure 1
represents the demand for sites in a single type or class of community, A.
The average cost of providing the service is paid through a local property
tax, the only local tax. The tax burden appears as a price to the
residents. Given the assumptions listed above, average cost, marginal cost,
and the tax price per site are identical in the long run so the equilibrium at
T is efficient and is the equilibrium number of sites in the type A
communities.
Edel and Sciar (19711) correctly point out that there is no capitalization
into land value in this situation even with consumer surplus LWT. There are a
sufficient number of towns so that any individual can find a site in an
acceptable community with or without service quality 3A• The marginal
consumer is just indifferent between living in this type A community and the
next best alternative type community. This person will not be willing to pay
more than $W which equals the net present value of the tax burden in a type A
city. No capitalization can occur because that would raise the entry price
above $W.
Edel and Sciar (19714) highlight that capitalization is crucially
dependent upon su:ly conditions. In Figure 2, there is a new supply schedule
indicating that c-y q5 sites in type A communities are available. Marginal
willingness to pay to live in a type A city is now $X per site.
Capitalization res.its "... assumingprices were set equal to the
average ... cos:"of producing the service SA (Edel and Sclar (19714, p.
91414)). Competitic: to live in one of' the limited type A cities will result in
capitalization int: land prices anytime the tax burden is less than the
-5-marginal willingness to pay to live in the city. In this case, the landowners
receive the rectangle WXYZ.2
Conceivably, the government could charge a tax price in excess of $W. In
the short-run shortage case, assumption (c) on competition does not fully
hold. The key distinction is between inter-type and intra-type competition
among communities. There is no decrease in the number of types (A, B, C,
etc.) of cities available, but there are no longer enough type A cities to
insure intra-type competition sufficient to force those governments to charge
no more than $W for the service flow associated with a site in a type A
locality. Inter-type competition among governments only prevents type A
communities from charging any more than $X, the highest entry fee attainable
before the excess demand for type A cities turns into an excess supply of type
A sites.
If for any reason the local government can charge a tax price above $W
per site (or lower effective publicly provided goods output), then some of
WXYZ in Figure 2 is transferred from landlords to the bureaucracy. For
example, capitalization of the excess return may be into public sector wages
rather than land values.P. tax price of $X per site would completely
eliminate capitalization into land values.
Clearly, the absence of tax or spending capitalization in the standard
housing price regression does not necessarily imply there is an efficient
allocation of local public goods and services as the early tests of the
Tiebout hypothesis have implied. Concomitantly, a decrease in capitalization
over time need not signal the approach of efficiency. It may be that changing
political forces have allowed the local public bureaucrats to capture the
benefits of running a city that is in excess demand. The implications for the
-6-equal utility hypothesis are discussed more fully in the following section
which outlines a test for public sector rent seeking.
In general, the extent of capitalization into land values at least
partially depends upon which interest groups can form and possibly combine to
split the rents. There are at least three distinct groups—-landlords
(homeowners), bureaucrats, and renters. Each group can try to capture all of
any rents for itself or combine with other groups to split the excess
returns. The greater the percentage of residents who are homeowners, the more
difficult it will be for bureaucrats or anyone else to capture any of the
excess return represented by WXYZ. Still, a majority homeownership group may
not be able to prevent any loss of r.ectangle WXYZ. As the public choice
literature has noted, certain revers.ion rules existing in many states may give
local bureaucracies strong bargaining power even vis-a-vis a large group of
landowners.3 Even in the absence of such special legislated advantages, free—
rider problems can prevent a large number of small diverse homeowners from
stopping a cohesive public sector bureaucracy from capturing any of WXYZ as
long as it is costly to oust the bureaucracy. Additionally, local politics
are often complex with multiple issues and candidates involved in the same
election. In this situation, voter ignorance in addition to free ridership
can prevent a majority group of homeowners from keeping all of WXYZ through
land value capitalization.
There certainly is no strong consensus as to the ability of local
bureaucracies (in center cities or residential suburbs) to control spending
and/or taxing agendas in order to increase their own utility. Economic theory
and complex gaming problems do not provide a definitive answer. Empirical
analysis will have to do this. Romer and Rosenthal's (1979) review of the
public choice research concludes that the available evidence did not support
—7—median voter control through the ballot box. If some local public
bureaucracies are able to capture some of the rents associated with a short-
run Tiebout disequilibrium situation, then there should be visible effects on
the extent of capitalization into land values across jurisdictions.
Section 4: Controlling for Rent—Capturing Bureaucracies in Capitalization
Studies
While urban economists have long realized that property value
differentials partially may reflect differences in the cost of providing local
public services, they have not been successful in controlling for bureaucratic
costs in capitalization studies. This section outlines a new test based on
the previous discussion of how introducing a rent-seeking local government
sector substantially alters the implications of the standard capitalization
tests in the Tiebout literature. At its simplest the model needs to be
expanded to include an additional equation (or equations) in order to be able
to generate some measure of successful public sector bureaucracy rent-
seeking. From that part of the estimation the measure of public sector rent
capture can then be included in a reduced form land value capitalization
equation such as the expanded Oates—type regression in (3),
(3) LVf(t, S, A, H, F, BR)e
where t represents the local tax rate(s), S is the measure of publicly
provided service(, A is a measure of amenities (nearness to downtown or the
beach), H is a ve::or of housing stock characteristics, and F is a vector of
personal characteristics such as family income, and BR is a measure of' rents
captured by the l::al bureaucracy.
Suppose that a local government is successful at capturing some or all of
the rents generat€ by the scarcity of a particular type of community. By
-8-capturing some of the rents we mean that there is an excess of total receipts
(from tax, debt, and other sources) over expenditures required to provide the
promised services. The proper approach to empirically testfor effects on
property values will depend critically on the manner inwhich the officials
choose to consume the economic rents. The most direct way is to increase
their total compensation. This can be accomplished through higher wages
and/or fringe benefits (i.e., lavish offices, generous expense accounts,
etc.). However, more subtle methods are also possible. For example, they can
keep their compensation constant but reduce the effort requiredfor their jobs
by engaging in overstaffing.
Unfortunately, each separate method of rent consumption requires a
different type of data in order to detect its presence. To our knowledge,
sufficient data are not readily available in order to adequately test for rent
consumption through higher fringes or methods such as overstaffing.Data and
statistical procedures are available to test whether rents are consumed
through higher wages. Labor economists in particular haveexamined whether a
given public sector employee receives a wage premiumrelative to a similarly
situated worker in the private sector. Researchers such as Smith (1981) have
found that some local government workers (particularly males in larger urban
areas) appear to earn substantially more (in nominal and real terms) than
similar private sector workers.
Typically, a micro data set on individual wages, personal attributes,and
job traits from a cross section of cities is used to estimate a public/private
sector wage differential. The simplest approach is to estimate a single wage
equation in which a government sector dummy variable is included (e.g.,Smith
(1981)). More sophisticated estimation strategies can be employed todeal
with problems that arise if public and private sectors comprise distinctlabor
—9—markets.5 An average of' the estimated wage premiums received by the local
public employees in a jurisdiction would be a proxy for the BR variable in
(3).
Assume that such a measure indicates that government wages are higher
than expected in a particular community given the wage structure in the
private sector. It would not necessarily be the case that local government
employees are consuming rents. Other plausible explanations for the
relatively high wages are that these workers have a higher productivity -than
is captured by the explanatory variables in the wage regressions but which is
observed by the community or that there are unaccounted for disamnenities
associated with the job and/or city. Fortunately, we can discriminate between
these possibilities in (3) because the explanations imply distinct effects
when the wage measure is added to a land value capitalization regression.
In this respect, it is important to realize that data on services in
particular usually are far from ideal in capitalization studies. A standard
practice is to use expenditures by type of service to proxy for output of
publicly produced goods and services. Not being able to control effectively
for real services provision means the coefficient on BR and the impacts on
other coefficients in (3) must be interpreted with care.
The wage rate premium coefficient should differ depending upon the source
of the differential. If successful bureaucracy rent-seeking occurs, the
coefficient will be negative, holding taxes and the services proxies
constant. This is because a lower effective level of services is implied from
the situation where total tax revenues remain constant while more of those
revenues are diverted to public sector wages. Residents have to be
compensated through lower land prices. In contrast, if the higher wages are
payments for higher productivity or for some uncontrolled for disamenity,
-10-there is no implicit reduction in effective services provision, with no
compensating land price change needed to keep utilities constant across
jurisdictions. Thus, the productivity explanation implies a zero rather than
a negative coefficient on the wage premium measure.
Including a control for public sector rent-grabbing should also influence
the coefficients on the other fiscal variables. For example, consider the
interpretation of the coefficient on a tax variable when some measure for
abnormal wages is not included in the specification. As the tax rate is
increased holding the real services output proxy (or proxies) constant, two
possible scenarios arise•. One is that the added tax revenues go to improving
genuinely desired services which are not fully picked up by the services
proxies. In this case, there is no reason for land values to change in order
to equate the utilities of mobile workers across jurisdictions.
Alternatively, the added revenues could go to (say) increased bureaucratic
wages (i.e., the entry price is raised above $W in Figure 2). In this
situation, land values would have to fall to compensate residents for the
higher tax burden. The coefficient on the tax rate in this situation reflects
the combined influences of' these two possibilities.6
Now, consider the effect of including the wage premium measure as an
estimate of BR in (3). Assume first that the measure accurately reflects rent
consumption and not something such as differential productivity. The
coefficient on the tax rate now more closely reflects the influence of
uncontrolled for changes in real services output and should have a coefficient
closer to zero (if the added real services output from the increased taxes are
genuinely desired by the population). However, if the wage differential
measure is picking up (say) unobserved productivity differentials, including
the variable in the regression should leave the tax coefficient unaffected as
—.11—.long as the wage differentials are exactly compensating (if the equal utility
hypothesis holds, of course). Thus, it should also be possible to
discriminate between the two general explanations for abnormal wages through
their impacts on the tax rate coefficients.
Admittedly, the data requirements of this proposed test are
substantial. In addition to the local fiscal information normally used,
micro-level wage, demographic, and job-related data on public and private
sector workers across a metropolitan area are also needed. However, -
consideringthe claims for bureaucracy agenda control in the public choice
literature and wage premium findings in public/private labor market studies,
future research should work on compiling the data needed to adequately test
for the effects of possible public sector rent capture on local land markets.
Unfortunately, we were not able to find or readilydevelop a sufficiently
detailed micro data set on workers across jurisdictions within a given urban
area to be able to reliably estimate public/private sector wage
differentials. However, we were able to estimate an expanded Oates-type
capitalization equation on a cross section of thirty-seven central cities
throughout the U.S. This approach does pose some problems such as how to
control for interrgional amenity differences not faced in the standard land
value capitalizati:r work.7 Interjurisdictional mobility is also a key
assumption in our analysis and mobility may not be sufficiently high across
widely dispersed c:zies except in the very long run. Consequently, our
results can only he viewed as suggestive. Finer intraurban data sets will
have to be developed in the future to perform a more powerful test.8
Data on work€s in the thirty-seven cities in our sample came from the
May 1977 Current F:ulation Survey (CPS). While the CPS does identify workers
residing in the ce:ral city part versus the rest of the SMSA (there are no
—12—other jurisdiction identifiers besides those for major central cities), the
limited number of complete observations on public sector employees even in
this large data base forced the use of' both central city and non-central city
observations when calculating wage differentials.
The wage premium proxy for the BR variable in (3) was calculated by
following an estimation strategy used by the authors in another paper (see
Tracy and Gyourko (1986)). There we modelled four separate labor markets—-
private nonunion sector, private union sector, public nonunion sector, and
public union sector. The "potential" wage for theth worker in the
population in each of these four labor markets (j1, 2, 3, 14) is given by
(ha) in W1 X.181 +U.1 (privatenonunion)
(14b) in W12 X2B2 +u2(private union)
(Ltc) in W3 X33 +u.3
(public nonunion)
(Ltd) in W XjhBh +u(public union)
where:u —N(Oc);
i 1,.. .,N; j 1,2,3,14.
The data vectors are indexed by the type of labor market since the
private sector equations contain industry dummy variabies while the public
sector equations contain level of government and public sector job
classification dummies. With this formulation, potential returrs for
individual characteristics can vary across each labor market.
Individuals are assumed to select which labor market to participate in by
choosing the market which maximizes lifetime expected utility. This utility
for the individual participating in the th market is modelled as
(5) I Z.y. +. . i 1,.. .,N
ij 1)
j 1,2,3,14
-13-Using the indicator function in (5), we proceeded to estimate the wage
equation in each market using the generalized two-stage procedure for
switching regressions with an endogenous switching rule discussed in Lee
(1982). Consistent estimates are obtained with this procedure.9
The coefficient vectors (6) of the two public sector wage equations
generated by the two-stage estimation of (14) and (5) were used to compute the




where i indexes the workers, j3 (public nonunion sector) or j 11 (public
union sector), and and t3 are the same as 63 in (14c) and 614 in (11d) except
each contains an added selectivity parameter. These coefficient vectors
include the standard human capital and demographic variables (education,
experience, race, sex, marital status, etc.), a cost—of-living index that
varies by city,1° regional dummies, dummies by type and level of government
worker,11 as well as the selection bias term.
The wage differential for a specific local public employee (Wdif1) is
calculated as the difference between the employee's actual wage (Wact1) and
his or her expected wage (Wexp) as shown in (7).
(7) Wdif. Wact. .- Wexp.
ii 1] 13
This differential measures how different are a specific local public
employee's actual wages from what would be expected for that employee in the
same job based on the coefficient vector generated using all the public
workers in the sample. For (say) a local police officer in New York City, the
measure reflects how different are his or her wages from what a similarlylooking police officer would expect to earn on average throughout all the
cities (controlling for cost—of—living differences and broad regional
amenities, too).
The estimated public sector wage differential for a city is the average
of these individual local public worker differentials in percentage terms.
This average is then used as the BR variable in (3) and (8).
The capitalization equation estimated is given in (8),
(8) lnPropa +a1nPTR +ci1riLOCINC +a1nSPENDPRC+a1nFAMINC79 c 0 1 c 2 c 3 c 14 c
+a1nHEAT +aNEWHOUSE +aBR +e
5 e 6 c 7 c c
where the c subscripts the thirty-seven cities i the sample and the other
variables are labelled in the key provided in Table 1.
Column one of Table 2 shows the regression results for (8) without any
bureaucratic rents variable. We included both effective property tax rates
and wage and/or payroll tax rates to capture the local tax environment. Over
one-third of the cities in the sample use a wage or income tax. The local
income tax rate has a negative coefficient and is significant at or near the
.10 level. The property tax rate has a small coefficient and is never
significantly different from zero. Residents appear to have to be compensated
through lower property prices for higher wage taxes but not for higher
property taxes. Local per capita spending has a significantly positive effect
on local property prices. Other variables thought to affect the level of
demand such as mean per capita income (FAMINC79) also significantly influence
property values in the anticipated direction. An increasing number of heating
degree days (HEAT) has a negative but not always highly significant effect on
housing values. The percentage of relatively new housing in the city is
-15—included as a control for the quality of the housing stock, and it always has
a significantly positive effect on median propertyvalue.12
Adding in the wage differential proxy for BR changes virtually none of
the regression results in a significant manner as the second column of Table 2
shows. The BR coefficient is negative but it is estimated very imprecisely.
These results are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that measured wage
differentials reflect primarily unmeasured productivity of public sector
workers and that public bureaucracy rent consumption is not significantly
influencing land prices across major cities although we have noted the power
of this test may not be very high.
Column three of Table 2 presents the regression results when the wage
differential data underlying the BR variable are represented in another
form. Instead of using the city averages of (7) directly, a dummy variable
for BR was constructed. If the average differential for the city was greater
than one standard deviation above the mean differential for all the cities,
then BR was set equal to one. Otherwise, BR was set equal to zero.
We did this for a variety of reasons. First, we suspected that the
relatively large measured differentials in some cities were more likely to be
indicative of some successful rent capture rather than primarily reflecting
unmeasured productivity differences across workers or other noise in the data
possibly involving factors such as uncontrolled for amenity differences.
Second, the marginal homeowner may have great difficulty in accurately
perceiving whether a relatively small differential represents pure rent
consumption by public officials or whether the differential reflects
compensation for scie uncontrolled for productivity or disarnenity associated
with the job or city. In a sense, the marginal homeowner has a similar
problem to the ecor.ometrician in that not everything can be observed so that
-16-.the smaller the differential the more difficult it is to tell whether it is
deserved or not. Only large wage differentials may be accurately perceived as
rent-grabbing on the part of local public employees.13
Third, we suspected that if local public employees were able to
appropriate some of the excess return arising from a shortage situation, they
would not consume the rents solely through higher wages. Some of the excess
return may be being consumed through abnormally high nonwage benefits
involving pension plans, sick leave, vacations, etc. Various other nonwage
amenities directly enhancing the workplace environment (e.g. plush offices)
may also be greater.
vlhen the actual estimated wage differentials from (7) are used in (8),
the coefficient on BR reflects solely the influence of the variance in the
measured wage differentials across cities. When BR is represented as a 0—1
dummy, its coefficient may reflect other forms of public sector rent
consumption such as higher benefits, plush offices, and the like. If
consumption of rents through wages is positively correlated with rent
consumption in other forms, and if nonwage rent consumption is quantitatively
important, then this new form of the BR variable will be able to pick up those
added influences.
The coefficient on BR in column three is negative and significant at. the
.05 level.1 This provides the first indication we are aware of that
potential residents may be being compensated through lower property prices in
cities where local public employees earn substantially higher wages than
similar local public employees earn on average in other cities.15
The coefficient implies that median property values were depressed by 29
percent in those seven cities with measured wage differentials in excess of
—17—one standard deviation above the sample average differential.
6The size of
this effect in absolute terms is easily calculated in (9) and (10),
(9) IPV —(.29)IPVAPV or IPV APV/.71,
where APV is the actual median property value as defined in Table 1, and IPV
is the implied median property value in the absence of the rent-grabbing local
public employees. Further,
(10) PV APV —IPV
with PV being the amount of the estimated decline in median house value.
Obviously, the estimation of' (10) is likely to be more accurate the
closer is a city's median house value to the overall sample average median
value. The full sample mean median house price is $30,775 with a standard
deviation of $11,937. There is a wide range in median values among the seven
relatively high wage cities with Detroit having the low value of $18,1142 and
Anaheim the high value of $56,589. Median values for 1976 and estimated
values of (10) are presented in Table 3. Our further comments are made
primarily with respect to Chicago because it has the APV closest to the sample
average APV.
The estimated changes in property value have direct implications on what
the level of local public employee rent consumption should be. In order to
calculate this value per local public worker, we begin by restating (10) in a
different form. We represent the estimated fall in property value as a
perpetuity in (11),
(11) -AnnualBurden of Excess Local Public Wages
— i
with (12) following
-18-(12) Annual Burden of Excess Local Public Wages PV*i
This assumes of course that a constant public employee wage premium is
expected to persist forever.
To compute (12), we used the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's mortgage
yield figure of 9 percent in 1976 as the discount factor i. The units of the
annual burden figure in (12) are a dollar amount per house. To arrive at a
dollar amount of rent consumption per local public worker, we need to multiply
(12) by the number of houses per local public worker as in (13),
(13) LPWR-
Annual Burden of Excess Local Public Wages Houses -
House Local Public Worker
where LPWR is the implied value of local public worker rent consumption. The
number of houses per local public worker was computed from information in the
1977 County and City Data Book. The number of equivalent full time local
public employees in the city is provided directly. The number of homes was
calculated by dividing the city's population by four.
For Chicago, the city closest to the average median housing price among
the seven relatively high wage cities, the value of LPWR was approximately
$8155. This is 52 percent of the average Chicago local public employee's
annual wage income.17 Assuming benefits are approximately one-third of wage
income,18 the value of rent consumption for a local public worker inChicago
equalled approximately 39 percent of the total wage-benefit package. While
these estimates are high, they are not completely unbelievable. In
particular, they should not readily be interpreted as implying that the wage-
benefit package for Chicago city employees would necessarily be 39 percent
lower in the absence of any rent-grabbing.19 Such simple ceteris paribus
experiments with a wage-benefit package may not be appropriate if everything
—19-else cannot really be held constant. In this respect, it is important to
remember that rents may be being consumed in other forms (overstaffing for
example) which are picked up in the BR coefficient used to generate PV in
(11).
Detroit was the city with the lowest median property value ($18,1142).
Its value for LPWR was $8337. This amounted to 147 percent of annual wage
income and 35% of' an estimated wage-benefit package. The results on LPWR for
Anaheim, the city with the highest median house value among the seven cities,
are an order of magnitude too large to be believable. The LPWR value was
$50,731. This was 305 percent of annual wage income and 229 percent of wages
and benefits. The 29 percent lower median house value implied by the BR
coefficient may not be very relevant for Anaheim. Anaheim's observed median
house price is in excess of two standard deviations above the sample average
median house price. Anaheim is also an outlier in the number of houses per
local public worker. It had almost twenty-four houses per full-time local
public employee in 1976 while the average for the other cities was ten.
Additionally, it could just be a statistical quirk of the sample that Anaheim
appears as a city with relatively high local publicwages.2°
While better local data on jurisdictions in individual metropolitan areas
are clearly needed, the results in Table 2 and in footnote 15 do provide the
first empirical evidence that local public sector rent seeking may be
influencing prices across land markets. We also believe that our approach
provides a sensible way to generate an estimate of public sector rent
consumption and that our estimation strategy can effectively discriminate
between real rent grabbing and noise in the data.21
-20-Section 5: Further Implications of Public Sector Rent-Seeking in a Tiebout
World
If public sector rent grabbing is occurring, it should have important
implications for the local regulatory process and, hence, for the political
and economic development of a city. There is an interesting political economy
of the battle for WXYZ in Figure 2 anytime landowners cannot easily prohibit
others' rent-seeking behavior. Consequently, it is important to realize that
the regulatory process can be used in various ways to capture rents or split
them with other parties. Indeed, legislated reversion rules have been viewed
as a mechanism to prevent homeowners constituting an electoral majority from
easily controlling a bureaucracy through the ballot box.
Land use controls are another interesting example. They can be very
effective at restricting entry, helping to perpetuate any excess demand
condition. Any interest group receiving rents would have an incentive to
support adoption of this regulation. Groups not currently capturing rents
might also favor such supply restrictions if they believe there is some
positive probability that fortunes will change, allowing them to obtain some
of the excess returns in the future.
While land use controls act as barriers to entry, different price—setting
regulations such as property tax rate caps and rent controls can be viewed at
least partially as rent—splitting devices. Some type of rent-splitting
solution will arise anytime a single group is not able to dominate the other
groups and reap all of rectangle WXYZ.
Property tax rate caps could set the price of a site anywhere between $W
and $X. If the local public bureaucracy has some monopoly power, possibly due
to labor union power or special reversion—type rules fostering agenda control,
property tax rate caps may be voted by the residents to restrict bureaucracy
rent-seeking. In Figure 3, tax rates are set so that the site price can rise
—21—no higher than $(X-B). The area XYR(X-B) remains as capitalization into land
values while (X-B)RZW is captured by the bureaucracy.It is possible that the
local public bureaucracy would even favor imposition of tax rate caps in this
shortage situation. This would be the case if the regulation was effective as
insurance against defeat or recall in an election with subsequent loss of all
economic rents. The tax rate caps may delineate just what type of rent-
splitting will be tolerated by resident landowners. The regulation could be
rent-maximizing over the long run for the bureaucracy if it decreases
-
uncertaintyabout the maximum entry price that can be charged before the
landowning electorate is likely to act to prevent any loss of' WXYZ in Figure
3.
Rent controls can serve a similar rent-splitting function. In excess
demand situations like that described above, renters and the public
bureaucracy both might favor rent controls. The bureaucracy could offer lower
publicly provided services prices to insure against recall along with rent
controls to limit capitalization into land values. In Figure 3, $(X—B) is
again the effective tax price of a site in the community with rent controls
such that the rental ceiling is equal to the long-run price of housing
services. In this case, the landlords reap none of' the excess return from the
shortage but they still will offer housing services in the city because a
competitive return is being received. With the site price set at $(X-B), the
distance B is the payment (in terms of lower service prices) to residents
(renters in particular) for keeping the bureaucracy in office. Admittedly,
this scenario is more likely in the larger more heterogeneous cities with
relatively large renter populations.22
Which regulations would appear at any given point in time depends upon
the relative bargaining power of the relevant interest groups and the costs of
-22-imposing them. It is beyond the scope of this paper to model in any detail
the politics that would allow any specific coalition to arise in order to
impose a given regulation. Rather, this section merely highlights that a
broader set of regulatory vehicles are available to rent-seeking bureaucracies
than has previously been investigated in the public choice literature. We
suggest that certain increasingly common regulations may have arisen at least
partially because of their utility as rent-enhancing or rent-splitting
devices. Additionally, the discussion in this section reemphasizes that-
successful bureaucratic rent-seeking further muddles interpretation of land
value capitalization in terms of the Tiebout hypothesis. How much of the
rectangle WXYZ in Figure 3 represents land value capitalization clearly can be
dependent upon the actions of a regulatory body and the attempts by various
actors to influence its behavior.
Section 6: Conclusion
Due to slowly adjusting supply conditions and imperfectly flexible
jurisdiction boundaries, localities in metropolitan areas may be in a Tiebout
disequilibrium like that discussed in Section 2 for long periods of time. The
capitalization literature has implicitly or explicitly assurried that landowners
reap all the benefits from such a shortage situation. This need not be the
case even in suburbs with little or no absentee landownership. Indeed,
researchers in the public choice literature contend that some local public
bureaucracies in these suburbs have been able to control budget agendas for
their own benefit.
We examined the potential for bureaucracy rent-seeking and its effects on
land value capitalization within a standard Tiebout model. There is an
interesting and complex political economy involved in the capturing of
economic rents in a Tiebout disequilibrium that largely has not been discussed
—23—in the literature. An array of regulatory devices including land use
controls, tax rate caps, and rent controls can be used to enlarge and divide
economic rents. Further, any successful public sector rent—seeking seriously
distorts interpretation of land value capitalization results in terms of the
Tiebout hypothesis. More sophisticated tests of the Tiebout hypothesis such
as that suggested by Epple, Visscher, and Zelenitz (1978) will have to account
for the added complications of public sector rent-seeking highlighted here.
Finally, a new approach to test for the presence of bureaucracy rent-
seeking was proposed. The test involved an expanded Oates-type capitalization
regression. The test exploits the fact that such rent-seeking should have
identifiable effects on land value capitalization assuming mobility is high
enough that a given individual can achieve equal utility in any locality
within some urban area. Although Epple and Zelenitz (1981) have pointed out
that the Oates regression generally does not adequately test the Tiebout
hypothesis, our expanded version could do so in certain instances. If the
rent-capturing proxies were significant, then we would know that public
services were not being efficiently provided. However, an insignificant
effect for the rent-capturing proxy would not necessarily imply that the
Tiebout propositions truly were operating.
Our results indicated that, even across major cities, differences in
successful rent capture by local public employees affected property prices.
We think the results strongly imply that further work needs to be done in this
area. In particular, data need to be found to perform a similar study across
jurisdictions within a single well—defined urban area. Also, different groups
of public workers may have different rent capturing abilities. Future work
should attempt to determine whether this is the case, and if so, why it is thecase. Information such as this may help explain why certain localities suffer
from rent—grabbing public sectors while other jurisdictions do not.
"—25-Footnotes
1See Rose-Ackerman (1983) for a thorough review of and bibliography on
these literatures.
2Absentee landlords typically are assumed to eliminate complications from
income effects. Competition among potential residents raises rent bids until
the sum of the rent plus tax costs just equals the marginal willingness to pay
to enter (all in per unit of the service terms). Land value rises because it
is the discounted value of the rent payments stream.
3See Romer and Rosenthal (1979) and Denzau and Grier (19814) for more
details on reversion rules and their effects on local school expenditures.
14See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) for a complete review of research on
public sector labor markets and how they appear to differ from private sector
markets.
5me single wage equation approach assumes that personal attributes such
as education and experience have the same return in the public and private
sectors. This need not be true if these are distinct labor markets.
Additionally, the choice of labor market may not be exogenous. If self-
selection is not controlled for, wage regression coefficients can be biased.
These and other econometric problems can be addressed by employing the
switching regression framework with an endogenous switching rule. Lee (1978,
1982) and Maddala (1983) provide outlines of the more advanced techniques.
6The services coefficients reflect similar combined references, too. We
do not go into that story for space reasons. Furtner, we are assuming
balanced budgets with no debt financing or intergovernmental grants--typical
underlying assumptions in empirical studies of capitalization. Our
interpretation is an example of the point made by Linneman (1978) that tax
(and spending) coefficients almost certainly represent more than just
-26-capitalization of'tax(or spending) differentials across jurisdictions. If
intergovernmental revenues are also a relevant omitted variable, then the tax
coefficient would also reflect differences in local grantsmanship abilities to
some extent.
7See Leeds (1985) for a critique of Tiebout-type studiesthat use
interregional rather than intraregional data.
8Thepower is low for the null hypothesis that there is successful local
public sector rent seeking and residents are compensated for this through
lower property prices. While a rejection of the null may notconvey important
information, any findings in support of the null hypothesis would be
especially encouraging given that the coefficient on BR in (3) probably is
biased towards zero because of our use of an interrnetropolitan city data base.
9See Tracy and Gyourko (1986,pp. 9—12) for a complete description of the
implementation of the two-stage procedure.
10The cost—of-living index is from the Bureau of LaborStatistics (BLS)
intermediate family budget data across metropolitan areas in the U.S. If
direct budget data was not available for a particular city, budget data froma
nearby city was substituted.
11Local public employees are distinguished from stateand federal
employees in the data. At the local public level, teachers and policemen—
firemen are further distinguished from all other local public sector workers.
12We experimented with various smallchanges in the specification. For
example, we included the percentage population change in the city from 1970 to
1980 to help control for demand shifts. The variable had a significantly
positive coefficient as expected. However, this variable turns out to be
fairly highly correlated with the level of family income across our cities.
Including the population change variable significantly weakens the family
-27-income effect without substantially affecting the other coefficients. Neither
this nor other similar specifications yielded results significantly different
from those reported in Table 2. Due primarily to the small sample size, we
attempted to keep the specification as parsimonious as possible and report
only (8) in Table 2.
13Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982) provide some evidence that
individuals do have trouble making fine distinctions about differences between
desired and actual public spending levels. Those authors had qualitative
response data from surveys on whether Michigan residents desired more, less,
or about the same level of spending on public education as currently existed
in their districts. Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro questioned whether
respondents could accurately determine whether they truly desired more or less
public spending if their desired amounts were only slightly more or slightly
less than the actual amount of spending taking place. They structured their
estimation so that they could solve this problem. They determined that
desired spending would have had to have been 1.5 times actual spending for an
individual to express a preference for more spending. In a similar vein, it
may be that a prospective resident cannot accurately discriminate between a
deserved wage premium and undeserved rent grabbing if the observed
differential is not somewhat of an outlier.
1We also ran a specification with the measured differential and its
square entered on the right-hand side. Both coefficients were insignificantly
different from zero.
5Four of the smaller cities in the sample (Akron, Albany, Columbus, and
Greensboro) had oniy four or five usable observations on local public
employees. Note that three of the four cities rank as having the smallest or
near the smallest measured average wage differentials. (See the table in the
-28-Appendix.) There is a greater probability for these cities than for the
others that the measured differentials do not accurately reflect the true mean
wage differential for local public employees in the relevant city. We
included these cities in the regressions reported in Table 2 because we were
worried about losing variance in the other variables since we started with a
relatively small sample size. Further, we do not know for sure that these
cities' differentials are substantially inaccurate.
Nevertheless, we did redo the regressions in Table 2 after dropping these
four cities. Thirty-three cities remained. Rerunning the specification in
column two yielded an estimated BR coefficient and standard error of -0.07 and
0.141, respectively. When BR is represented as a 0—i dummy as in column three,
the coefficient and standard error based on the smaller sample were -0.26 and
0.12, respectively. Other coefficients were generally not materially affected
either.
l6This is arrived at by following the algorithm suggestedby Halvorsen
and Palmquist (1950) for adjusting dummy variable coefficients in
semilogarithmic ec..ations. The implied percentage difference in land values
is given by 100(ex:(ci7) —1)where is the coefficient on BR in (8) when BR
is represented as a 0 —1dummy.
17Frorn the CF. data, we calculated the averagewage across the Chicago
local public workers in the sample. Annual wage income was computed assuming
the employee was paid for working 140 hours per week throughout the year or for
2080 hours.
18Zax (1983, ;85) provides evidence that various benefits (pension,
medical, miscellar.3us) do comprise one-third or more of wage income of local
public employees.19However, our estimated public-private wage differential for Chicago
local public employees was 30.3 percent.
20Results for most of the other cities were sensible and similar to those
reported for Chicago and Detroit. The only exception was St. Petersburg where
the LPWR figure was again unbelievably high. It amounted to almost 90 percent
of wages and benefits. Baltimore had the smallest absolute and percentage
LPWR effect. Its LPWR figure was $1421114 and was only 20% of annual wage income
plus benefits.
is worth noting that we calculated the wage premium measure in
another way, too. We began by simply estimating via OLS two semi-log wage
equations across workers in each city in the sample.
(9)lnwage. B +X. +BDOC.+BU. +BR.+CLI. +
i,pr 0 1 i,pr 2 1,pr 3 i,pr14 i,pr 5i,pr
e. ,i1,...rn
i,pr
(10) ln Wage 8' +8'X. +B'DOC. +B'U. +B'R. +8'CLI. +
j,pu 0 1 j,pu 2j,pu 3 j,pu 14 i,pu 5i,pu
e. ,j1,.. .,n
pu
where i and j subscript individual worker observations, pr and pu denote the
public and private sectors, respectively, X is a vector of the standard worker
traits normally used (e.g., age, race, sex, marital status, experience,
education), DOC are detailed occupation dummies from the CPS, U is a union
dummy variable, R :s a vector of region dummies, CLI is the cost—of-living
index for each city. and e is the mean zero error term, and the Bs and 8'S are
coefficients or coefficient vectors.
Public/private sector wage differentials were then calculated. A public
sector worker in a given detailed occupation was matched into as similar an
occupation as possi:e in the private sector. There were some problems with
'-30-matching specific public sector employees to detailed occupations in the
private sector. For example, policemen were assigned to the private sector
occupation "Protective Services." That occupation covers building security
jobs which are not as hazardous as police work. This inability to fully
control for job-related differences in the matching process adds noise to the
calculated wage differentials and is a major reason we report the results
based on the other differentials.
An expected wage in the private sector for a specific local public -
employeewas then computed using the private sector coefficient vectors (the
Bs). The individual's wage differential is the actual wage received by the
local public employee minus his/her expected wage in a similar private sector
job. A city's wage differential is the average of the individual public
worker differentials in percentage terms. This average was then used as the
BR variable.
The coefficient and standard error on this version of the BR variable
were —0.09 and O.10, respectively. We also constructed the BR variable as a
0 -1dummy in the same manner as with the other wage premium measure. The
coefficient and standard error on this version of the BR variable were -0.12
and 0.12, respectively.
When the four small cities with very few local public worker observations
are dropped from the sample and the regressions rerun on the smaller sample,
the results were not significantly changed.
is even conceivable that landowners would favor rent controls as a
rent splitting device although some extreme assumptions need to be imposed.
An earlier version of this paper contained a detailed example. It can be
summarized in terms of Figure 3. The case was for a city where all
landownership was absentee. Note that since $X is the true willingness to pay
-31—for a site, competition among potential residents guarantees that $X is what
will be paid ultimately. In this case, landowners cannot credibly convince
renters it is worthwhile to prevent the public bureaucracy from raising the
site price. If landlords were willing to make side payments of' $B to renters
if the government is recalled, the full entry price to the city would fall to
$(X—B). As long as there is excess demand there will always be potential
residents bidding the entry price back up to $X by rebating the side payment
back through higher rents.
-
Stringenttemporary rent controls which also prohibit cash side payment
schemes such as key money could actually benefit landlords in this
situation. With a mandated rent control ceiling of ${(X-B)-W}, voting renters
would have an Incentive to force the bureaucracy to set an entry price of
$W. Residents will still pay $X to live in the city, but the rent control
prevents full payment from being in cash. Nonmonetary payments represented by
the distance B in Figure 3 will be made, with voting to prevent the
bureaucracy from raising tax rates or cutting service levels one important
example of such payment. Capitalization into land values is represented by
the smaller rectangle W(X-B)RZ. Landlords have to trade off some of the
potential short-run gain in the form of lower housing prices because renters
are incurring, some nonmonetary costs to live in the city.
The beneficial aspects of rent controls to landlords arise in this case
because they could not otherwise credibly persuade the resident renters it was
in their interest to restrain the bureaucracy. While a contrived example,
this case and the ones outlined in the text further indicate the various
possible uses of price-setting rules as rent-splitting devices for different
factions in a metropolitan area not in full Tiebout equilibrium. The
durability of rent controls in the U.S. in the face of their obvious high
-32-costs may well be due to the fact that various groups, not just a single group
of renters, benefit from the regulation.
-.33—References
Bergstrom, T., Rubinfeld, D., and Shapiro, P., "Micro-Based Estimates of
Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures," Econornetrica 50, no. 5,
(1982): 1183—1205
Denzau, A. and Grier, K., "Determinants of Local School Spending: Some
Consistent Estimates," Public Choice 1414,no.2 (1984): 375-384.
Edel, Matthew, and Sciar, Elliot, "Taxes, Spending, and Property Values:
Supply Adjustment in a Tiebout-Oates Model," Journal of Political Economy
82, no. 5 (September/October 19714):9141_54.
Epple, Dennis, and Zelenitz, Allen, "The Implications of Competition Among
Jurisdictions:Does Tiebout Need Politics?" Journal of Political
Economy 89: 1197—1217.
Ehrenberg, R. and J. Schwarz, "Public Sector Labor Markets," National Bureau
of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 1179, August 1983.
Epple, Dennis, Zelenitz, Allan, and Visscher, Michael, "A Search for Testable
Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy 86,
no. 3 (June 1978): 405—25.
Henderson, 3.Vernon,"The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs,"
Journal of Political Economy 93, no. 2 (April 1985): 2148—264.
Inman, Robert P., "Public Employee Pensions and the Local Labor Budget,"
Journal of Public Economics 19 (1982): 149_71.
Leeds, Michael A., "Property Values and Pension Underfunding in the Local
Public Sector," Journal of Urban Economics 18, no. 1 (1985): 34_146.
Linnernan,Peter, "The Capitalization of Local Taxes: A Note on
Specification," Journal of Political Economy 86 (1978) 535-8.
Maddala, G. S., Limited-Dependent aridQualitativeVariables in Econometrics.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
_311_Meadows, George R., "Taxes, Spending, and Property Values: A Comment and
Further Results," Journal of Political Economy 814, no. 14 (1976): 869—
880.
Niskanen, William, "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics
(December 1975).
Oates, Wallace, "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the
Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy 77, no. 6
-
(November/December1969): 957-71.
Romer, Thomas and Rosenthal, Howard, "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the
Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," Quarterly
Journal of Economics (November 1979): 563-587.
__________"TheElusive Median Voter," Journal of Public Economics 12
(1979): 1143—170.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, "Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of
Local Government," in Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout
Model after Twenty-Five Years (George Zodrow, editor). New York:
Academic Press, 1983.
Rosen, Harvey and Fullerton, David, "A Note on Local Tax Rates, Public Benefit
Levels, and Property Values," Journal of Political Economy 85, no. 2
(1977): 1433...1414O.
Sarnuelson,Paul, "A Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics
and Statistics 36, (November 19514): 387-9.
Smith, Sharon P., "Public/Private Wage Differentials in Metropolitan Areas,"
in Public Sector Labor Markets, Peter Mireszkowski and George Peterson
(eds.), The Urban Institute, 1981, 81-103.
-35-Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on Government Finances, New York: Tax
Foundation, Inc., 1978.
Tiebout, Charles M., "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of
Political Econçy 65, no. 5 (October 1956): )416_214.
Tracy, J. and Gyourko, J., "An Analysis of Public and Private Sector Wages
Allowing for Endogenous Choices of Both Government and Union Status"
(February 1986), discussion paper.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, Washington, D.C.: GPO, Vol.
II, 1977.
_________Countyand City Data Book, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977 and 1983.
Zax, Jeffrey, S., "Labor Relations, Wages and Nonwage Compensation in
Municipal Employment," NBER Working Paper, No. 1582, March 1985.
_________"NonwageCompensation: Past Growth and Future Prospects,"
Discussion Paper, Harvard University, April 1983.
-36—Table 1: Variable Key
PROP* Median single family house price (1976)
PTR** =Effectivelocal property tax rate (1976)
LOCINC*** =Localpayroll or wage tax rate (1976)
SPENDPRC**** =Totallocal public spending percapita(1976)
FAMINC79**** =Medianfamily incon (1979)
HEAT**** =Nuntherof heating degree days (1975) -
NEWHOt.JSE***** =Percentageof single family housing stock constructed
after 1960 (1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978)
BR =Measureof public sector rent capture
*For most cities this nunber was collected from Annual Housing Survey
(AklS) reports. For some cities, the 1976 median house price values were
available. Other cities were sampled by the AHS in either 1975, 1977, or
1978. Values for those cities were adjusted by the change in the Home
Purchase Price component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the
appropriate time period to estimate what the median price would have been in
1976. Four of the cities in the sample (Akron, Gary, Greensboro, and St.
Petersburg) were never surveyed in the AIlS. We calculated median house value
for 1976 based on 1970 and 1980 values reported in the 1977 and 1983 issues of
the County and City Data Book. We assumed a constant rate of change in value
beginning with the 1970 price which would yield the published 1980 value.
**The effective property tax rate is for the central city (not the
overall SMSA) and is a nominal rate corrected for by the local assessment—
sales ratio. These data are from Volume II of the Census of Governments for
1976.
***Local payroll or wage taxes for the central city were collected from
Facts and Figures on Government Finances published by the Tax Foundation.
****These variables were collected from issues of the County and City
Data Book. They are for the central city only (although the distinction from
the entire SMSA is irrelevant for the IAT variable).
*****Data for this variable were collected from various years of the
Annual Housing Survey (AIlS) and the County and City Data Book. The specific
year used for each city depended upon whether the city was included in the
AHS, arid if so, in what year.Table 2: Capitalization Regressions
Dependent Variable: Lri Median House Value (1976)
Independent (1) (2) (3)
Variables
Intercept 0.73 0.31 —0.92
(3.68) (3.76) (3.41)
Lii PTR 0.05 0.06 0.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Ln LOCINC —0.16 _0.17* _0.15*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Ln SPENDPRC 0.29** 0.32** 0.38**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Lii FAMINC79 0.75** 0.78** 0.93**
(0.35) (0.36) (0.33)
Lii HEAT —0.05 —0.06 -0.10
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)




R2 0.34 0.33 0.45
F 4.05 3.48 5.17
PROB > F .0043 .0079 .0007
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
**denotessigiiificance at .05 level






















* Morethan twostandarddeviations above the overall sample mean.
**More than one standard deviation below the overall sample mean.
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MedianHouse PV
City Price(1976) from(10)Appendix: City Rankings by Measured Wage Differential
(Largest Differential Receives Highest Ranking)
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Note: A ''indicatesthe measured differential is in excess of one standard
deviation above the mean differential across all cities in the
sample. The starred cities have codings of when the wage
differential variable is represented as a 0—1 dummy in Tables 2 and 3.Price
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Figure 3. Division of Capitalization Proceeds
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